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For a number of years economists have debated the optimal speed and se-
quencing of economic reform. These debates have been particularly heated
regarding the lifting of capital controls and the opening of the capital ac-
count of the balance of payments. While for some authors the free move-
ment of capital across borders is welfare enhancing, for others it represents
a clear peril, especially for the emerging nations. According to the latter
view, free capital mobility—and in particular the free mobility of ﬁxed in-
come securities—increases macroeconomic volatility and makes emerging
countries vulnerable to the destabilizing eﬀects of external shocks. Thus,
the theory goes, restrictions on capital movements should be lifted gradu-
ally, toward the end of the reform process and only after other markets have
been liberalized. The supporters of freer capital mobility, on the other
hand, have argued that there are no reasons for postponing the opening of
the capital account. These authors point out that restricting capital mobil-
ity results in serious economic costs in the form of capital market in-
eﬃciencies and resource misallocation. Discussions on the role of capital
controls and capital ﬂows—and, in particular, speculative capital 
ﬂows—became particularly pointed in the aftermath of the East Asian
currency crisis of 1997. According to Stiglitz (2002), for instance, the re-
laxation of capital controls was at the center of the crisis and of the East
Asian nations’ currency collapses.1
Questions related to the speed and sequencing of reform are not new in
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1. In preparing this introduction I have drawn on some of my previous writings on capital
controls, capital account liberalization, and economic reform.policy discussions. In fact, since the beginning of the economics profession
these issues have arisen over and over again. Adam Smith, for example, ar-
gued in The Wealth of Nations that determining the appropriate sequenc-
ing was a diﬃcult issue that involved, primarily, political considerations
(see Smith 1776/1937, book IV, chapter VII, part III, p. 121). Moreover,
Smith supported gradualism on the grounds that cold-turkey liberalization
would result in a signiﬁcant increase in unemployment. Consider the fol-
lowing passage from The Wealth of Nations: “To open the colony trade all
at once . . . might not only occasion some transitory inconvenience, but a
great permanent loss....  [T]he sudden loss of employment . . . might
alone be felt very sensibly” (vol. II, chap. VII, part III, p. 120).
Speed and sequencing also became central in analyses on how to design
a reform strategy for the former Communist countries. In discussing the
problems faced by Czechoslovakia during the early period of its transition,
then ﬁnance minister Vaclav Klaus (1991) pointed out that one of the main
problems was deciding on “sequencing as regards domestic institutional
and price measures on the one hand, and liberalization of foreign trade and
rate of exchange on the other” (p. 18).
In the 1980s the World Bank became particularly interested in exploring
issues related to sequencing and speed of reform and, in particular, issues
related to the role of capital controls during the reform process. As a result
of the discussion surrounding this work, a consensus of sorts developed on
sequencing and speed of reform. The most important elements of this con-
sensus included the following: (a) trade liberalization should be gradual
and buttressed with substantial foreign aid;2 (b) an eﬀort should be made
to minimize the unemployment consequences of reform; (c) in countries
with very high inﬂation, ﬁscal imbalances should be dealt with very early
on in the reform process; (d) ﬁnancial reform requires the creation of mod-
ern supervisory and regulatory agencies; and (e) the capital account
should be liberalized at the very end of the process, and only once the
economy has been able to expand successfully its export sector. Of course,
not everyone agreed with all of these recommendations, but most econo-
mists involved with reform did. In particular, people at the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) did not object, or at least did not object openly and
strongly, these general principles. For example, Jacob Frenkel, who was to
become the IMF’s Economic Counsellor, had argued in the mid-1980s in
an IMF StaﬀPapers article (Frenkel 1983) that the capital account should,
indeed, be opened gradually and toward the end of the reform process.
Some time during the early 1990s this received wisdom on capital restric-
tions, capital account liberalization, sequencing, and speed began to be
challenged, and some authors began to call for simultaneous and very fast
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2. Although what exactly was meant by “gradual” was never speciﬁed. Indeed, the (im-
plicit) deﬁnition of “gradualism” seemed to change through time.reforms. To a large extent the argument was based on political economy
considerations. If reforms are not implemented rapidly and simultaneously,
the argument went, opponents would successfully block liberalization
eﬀorts. In the early 1990s the U.S. government also began to argue that the
time had come for the East Asian nations to liberalize their capital account
restrictions and to allow capital to move more freely. Policymakers and ac-
ademics throughout East Asia became concerned about these recommen-
dations. They had two main worries. On the one hand, they argued that lift-
ing capital controls and liberalizing the capital account would result in
massive real exchange rate appreciation, something that had indeed hap-
pened in a number of Latin American countries during the early 1980s. The
problem, of course, was that an appreciating real exchange rate was in con-
tradiction with East Asia’s decades-old policies of maintaining a highly
competitive real exchange rate as a way of encouraging exports. The main
worry was based on the possibility of a sudden stop of capital inﬂows. More
speciﬁcally, it was argued that if after entering the country capital ﬂows sud-
denly declined or, worse yet, reversed, the country would be left perma-
nently with a smaller export market. A second concern was that massive
capital inﬂows were likely to feed a real estate boom and bubble that would
make the economy particularly vulnerable to ﬁnancial shocks.
In a paper delivered at a conference organized by Korea University,
Robert Mundell argued that most concerns on the rapid and early lifting
of capital controls were well founded. Consider the following quotation:
Unfortunately . . . there are some negative externalities [of an early cap-
ital account liberalization]. One is that the borrowing goes into con-
sumption rather than into investment, permitting the capital-importing
country to live beyond its means . . . without any oﬀset in future output
with which to service the loans. Even if the liabilities are entirely in
private hands, the government may feel compelled to transform the un-
repayable debt into sovereign debt rather than allow execution of mort-
gages or other collateral. (Mundell 1995, p. 20)
At the same conference the late Manuel Guitián, then a senior oﬃcial at
the IMF, argued in favor of moving quickly toward capital account con-
vertibility. Guitián’s paper—suggestively titled “Capital Account Liberal-
ization: Bringing Policy in Line with Reality”—was one of the ﬁrst written
pieces to document the IMF’s change in views regarding sequencing and
capital account convertibility. After discussing the evolution of the inter-
national ﬁnancial markets and expressing reservations about the “capital-
account-last” sequencing recommendation, Guitián summarized his views
as follows: “There does not seem to be an a priori reason why the two ac-
counts [current and capital] could not be opened up simultaneously....
[A] strong case can be made in support of rapid and decisive liberalization
in capital transactions” (Guitián 1995, pp. 85–86).
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tries should lift capital controls and open up their capital account became
dominant at the IMF and the U.S. Treasury. Starting in 1995 more and
more emerging countries began to relax their controls on capital mobility.
In doing this, however, they tended to follow diﬀerent strategies and paths.
While some countries relaxed bank lending only, other countries allowed
only long-term capital movements, and yet others—such as Chile—used
market-based mechanisms to slow down the rate at which capital was ﬂow-
ing into the country. Many countries, however—including some that later
faced severe crisis—did not need any prodding by the IMF or the United
States to open their capital account. Indonesia and Mexico, to mention
just two important cases, had a long tradition of free capital mobility.
Malaysia’s reliance on capital controls on outﬂows after the collapse of
its currency in 1997 generated new debates in academic circles. It recovered
fast after the 1997 crisis—although not as fast as South Korea—but it is
not clear whether recovery was the result of the imposition of capital con-
trols and of ﬁxing of the exchange rate. In a paper presented at an NBER
conference Kaplan and Rodrik (2002) provided a detailed discussion of
Malaysia’s unorthodox reaction to the currency upheaval of 1997–98. The
authors note that the imposition of capital controls by Malaysia, in Sep-
tember 1998, was greeted with great skepticism by most analysts and ob-
servers. In particular, IMF oﬃcials and investment banks’ analysts argued
that these controls—and the accompanying decisions to peg the exchange
rate and lower domestic interest rates—would result in a slower recovery
and in a signiﬁcant reduction in foreign direct investment (FDI) into
Malaysia. This latter (potential) eﬀect of the controls was considered to be
particularly devastating, as Malaysia has traditionally relied heavily on
FDI. Kaplan and Rodrik argue that this general perception is incorrect,
and that once the appropriate econometric techniques are used there is ev-
idence suggesting that Malaysia’s unorthodox program yielded very posi-
tive results. The late Rudi Dornbusch (2002) took issue with this view, and
argued that the relatively good performance of the Malaysian economy in
the postcrisis period had little to do with the controls. In his opinion, a very
friendly international environment—driven mostly by successive cuts in
interest rates by the Federal Reserve—was the main force behind Ma-
laysia’s recovery of 1999–2000.
The papers and commentary presented in this volume were presented at
a conference held in December 2004 in Santa Barbara, California. The
main purpose of the conference was to analyze the mechanisms that diﬀer-
ent countries have used to slow down, or control, capital inﬂows, and in
particular capital inﬂows associated with ﬁxed income securities. We were
interested in exploring country experiences and in evaluating whether the
tools chosen by diﬀerent countries were eﬀective in reducing the ﬂow of
capital, altering the maturity of the resulting external debt, and reducing
4 Sebastian Edwardsmacroeconomic vulnerability. We were also interested in investigating the
extent to which the diﬀerent tools used to (partially) control capital inﬂows
implied eﬃciency costs. One of the salient features of the country-speciﬁc
papers collected in this volume is that they all provide detailed chronolo-
gies on the evolution of capital controls in each of the countries. These
chronologies focus on the speciﬁc tools used to control ﬂows, as well as on
the liberalization eﬀorts undertaken during the last few years. They also
provide information on crises and other important events.
The volume is divided into two parts. Part one contains ﬁve chapters that
deal with systemic issues related to capital mobility, with an emphasis on
ﬁxed income securities. These chapters discuss analytical and theoretical
issues and provide cross-country evidence on the eﬀectiveness, conse-
quences, and costs of restricting capital mobility. Part two comprises nine
policy and applied papers. There are eight country case studies, for Chile,
Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, and India,
and a broad paper that evaluates, from a comparative perspective, the
eﬀects of capital controls on economic performance.
Capital Controls in the Emerging Countries: 
Analytical Issues and Cross-Country Evidence
The ﬁrst chapter is “Capital Flows in a Globalized World: The Role of
Policies and Institutions,” by Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and
Vadym Volosovych. In this chapter the authors use data for 1970–2000 to
analyze the patterns of international capital ﬂows. They are particularly in-
terested in analyzing what determines capital ﬂow in certain directions,
and what the main determinants of capital ﬂow volatility are. In analyzing
these issues Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych pay particular atten-
tion to the role played by economic policy and by the quality of national in-
stitutions. The authors point out that in spite of their large increase during
the last few years, capital ﬂows to the emerging countries continue to be
signiﬁcantly lower than what is predicted by theory (this is the so-called
Lucas paradox). Using data on ﬂows extracted from balance-of-payments
statistics, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych use regression analysis
to determine whether institutional factors can explain (at least partially)
the Lucas paradox. They conclude that the quality of institutions—mea-
sured by variables such as the origin of the country’s legal system and the
mortality rate of original colonial settlers—plays an important role in ex-
plaining the direction and magnitude of capital ﬂows in the 1970–2000 pe-
riod. But institutions are not the only determinant of capital inﬂows. The
authors ﬁnd that, for given institutional quality, economic policy plays an
important role. This is particularly the case when policy is measured by in-
ﬂation, the degree of ﬁnancial development, and the extent of capital con-
trols. The authors also provide evidence suggesting that the quality of in-
stitutions and economic policy have played an important role in the
Introduction 5determination of the (relatively) high degree of volatility of capital ﬂows to
the emerging markets in the 1970–2000 period. A particularly interesting
ﬁnding reported by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych is that local ﬁ-
nancial structure—measured as the share of bank credit in total credit—
has been positively related to capital ﬂows’ volatility in the 1970–2000 pe-
riod.
In “Capital Controls, Sudden Stops, and Current Account Reversals,” I
use a broad multicountry data set to analyze the relationship between re-
strictions to capital mobility and currency crises. My analysis focuses on
two manifestations of external crises: (a) sudden stops of capital inﬂows,
where capital ﬂowing into a country experiences a major reduction (at least
4 percent of gross domestic product [GDP] in one year); and (b) current ac-
count reversals, where a country reduces its deﬁcit by at least 3 percent of
GDP in one year. I address two important policy-related issues. First, I an-
alyze whether the extent of capital mobility aﬀect countries’ degree of vul-
nerability to external crises. In doing this I consider several manifestations
of external crises. Second, I analyze whether the extent of capital mobility
determines the depth of external crises—as measured by the decline in
growth—once a crisis occurs. I use a new index of the degree of capital mo-
bility, which has greater country coverage and allows for a broader spec-
trum of policies than previous indexes. I use both nonparametric statisti-
cal techniques and regression analyses. In particular, I rely on treatment
models, where the probability of facing a crisis and the eﬀects of the crisis
on growth are estimated simultaneously. Overall, my results cast some
doubts on the assertion that increased capital mobility has caused height-
ened macroeconomic vulnerability and has increased the probability of an
external crisis. I ﬁnd no systematic evidence suggesting that countries with
higher capital mobility tend to have a higher incidence of crises, or tend to
face a higher probability of having a crisis, than countries with lower mo-
bility. My results do suggest, however, that once a crisis occurs, countries
with higher capital mobility may face a higher cost in terms of growth de-
cline. My results also indicate that a country’s degree of trade openness is
an important determinant of the growth costs of current account reversals.
Countries that are more open to international trade tend to suﬀer smaller
declines in GDP growth than countries that are less open to international
trade.
In “Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original Sin: Why
They Are Not the Same and Why It Matters,” Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo
Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza analyze the role of balance sheet eﬀects in ﬁ-
nancial crises. Their work focuses on problems with the structure of global
ﬁnancial markets that result in the inability of economies to borrow abroad
in their own currencies. In particular, they inquire whether the degree of
capital mobility aﬀects countries’ ability to borrow internationally in their
own currency. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza analyze the impact
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tal ﬂows, the management of exchange rates, and the creditworthiness of
countries. They argue that when considering the behavior of such variables
it is important to distinguish clearly three concepts: “original sin,” “debt
intolerance,” and “currency mismatches.” They argue that macroeconomic
stability, strong institutions, and a record of low inﬂation are not enough
for countries to be able to borrow in their own currency. Chile, they point
out, is a case in point. Being unable to borrow in its own currency, Chile re-
lied on controls on capital inﬂows as a way of reducing its vulnerability to
external shocks. The authors show that countries that are unable to borrow
in their own currency tend to hold larger stocks of international reserves
and tend to have more rigid exchange rate regimes. The extent of currency
mismatches, however, has no eﬀect on exchange rate policy. It does aﬀect,
on the other hand, the level of international reserves held by the monetary
authorities. Eichengreen and his coauthors also show that the degree of
debt intolerance has no statistical eﬀect on the volatility of GDP growth. It
does appear to aﬀect, however, the degree of volatility of capital ﬂows.
Eichengreen and his coauthors investigate why some countries are unable
to borrow internationally in their own currency. Their results suggest that
original sin is robustly related to country size and to countries’ status as ﬁ-
nancial centers, advanced economies, or emerging markets, but that it is
only weakly related to institutional variables like rule of law and measures
of policy like inﬂation and ﬁscal history.
In “The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls: No Free Lunch”
Kristin J. Forbes discusses the microeconomic consequences of capital
controls. She argues that although macroeconomic analyses of capital con-
trols are useful, they have faced a number of imposing challenges and have
yielded inconclusive results. In order to have a more complete sense of the
eﬀects of capital controls it is important to understand how this policy
aﬀects incentives and microeconomic decisions. In this paper Forbes sur-
veys an emerging literature that evaluates various microeconomic eﬀects
of capital controls and capital account liberalization. Several key themes
emerge. This literature has focused on several microeconomic eﬀects of
capital controls. First, controls on capital mobility—controls on both in-
ﬂows and outﬂows—tend to reduce the supply of capital, raise the cost of
ﬁnancing, and increase ﬁnancial constraints. This is particularly the case
for smaller ﬁrms that don’t have access to international capital markets or
to preferential lending. Second, capital controls aﬀect market discipline.
There is indeed evidence suggesting that the existence of controls leads to
a more ineﬃcient allocation of capital and resources. Third, the existence
of capital controls distorts decision making by ﬁrms and individuals. This
is because economic agents will spend time and resources attempting to
evade the controls or minimize their costs. Fourth, the eﬀects of capital
controls can vary across ﬁrms and countries, and may even magnify exist-
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(on both inﬂows and outﬂows) can be diﬃcult and costly to enforce, even
in countries with sound institutions and low levels of corruption. A partic-
ularly useful contribution of Forbes’s paper is that she summarizes the ev-
idence on the microeconomic consequences of the well-known and often
praised Chilean controls on capital inﬂows. She argues that this policy gen-
erated nontrivial microeconomic costs, through resource misallocation
and by increasing the reliance on retained earnings as a source of ﬁrms’ ﬁ-
nancing.
The next paper is by Linda S. Goldberg. In “The International Exposure
of U.S. Banks: Europe and Latin America Compared” she documents the
changing international exposures of U.S. bank balance sheets since the
mid-1980s. Goldberg does this by using a new and unique data set on cross-
border transactions by U.S. banks. The data set is a time series panel of in-
dividual U.S. exposure to foreign markets. Each bank reports a country-
by-country distribution of foreign claims. In addition, the data set contains
detailed information on the type of claims, valuation of derivatives posi-
tions, maturity composition, and categories of recipient of the claims.
Goldberg ﬁnds that U.S. banks have foreign positions heavily concentrated
in Europe. She also ﬁnds that in recent years some cross-border claims on
Latin American countries have declined, while claims extended locally by
the branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banks have grown. Goldberg investi-
gates whether bank size matters for explaining foreign claims’ volatility.
She ﬁnds that the foreign exposures of larger U.S. banks have tended to be
less volatile than claims of smaller banks, and locally issued claims have
tended to be more stable than cross-border ﬂows. Goldberg also analyzes
the way in which the cycle aﬀects foreign claims of U.S. banks. She ﬁnds
that business cycle variables have mixed inﬂuence on U.S. bank cross-
border and local claims. The cross-border claims of U.S. banks on Euro-
pean customers tend to be procyclical. This contrasts with the case of local
claims and cross-border claims on Latin American customers of U.S.
banks. Neither of these claims is signiﬁcantly related to variables that cap-
ture either the U.S. or the international business cycle. U.S. banks do not
appear to be an important channel for transmitting U.S. cycles to smaller
economies (including emerging economies). Indeed, Goldberg’s results
suggest that U.S. banks may even play a positive role in helping reduce the
amplitude of business cycles in smaller nations.
Country Studies
In “International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate:
Lessons from Chile” Kevin Cowan and José De Gregorio discuss Chile’s
experience with capital account restrictions and exchange rate policy. Dur-
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s syndicated loans were the most impor-
tant form of capital inﬂows into Chile. As a way of controlling capital in-
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posed severe restrictions on bank lending to Chile. Only longer-maturity
loans (maturities in excess of sixty-six months) were allowed freely; any
loan with a maturity shorter than twenty-four months was forbidden. In
spite of these severe restrictions, in 1982 Chile experienced a deep and
highly traumatic currency crisis. The authors argue that one of the reasons
for the severity of this crisis was that in the 1980s the Chilean economy was
characterized by signiﬁcant currency mismatches. Many of the ﬁrms that
had borrowed in foreign currency produced nontradable goods and had
peso-denominated assets. In the main part of the paper Cowan and De
Gregorio analyze the eﬀectiveness of Chile’s well-known and often-
discussed policy of controlling capital inﬂows during the 1990s. They con-
clude that capital controls were only partially eﬀective and that the main
source of macroeconomic vulnerability during the 1990s was an overly
rigid exchange rate policy. In their analysis the authors discuss three im-
portant characteristics of the Chilean experience during the 1990s. First,
most international borrowing was done directly by ﬁrms and thus was not
intermediated by the banking system. Second, the free trade agreement be-
tween Chile and the United States put some limits on Chile’s ability to rely
on capital controls in the future. And third, after examining Chile’s expe-
rience after the Asian-Russian crisis, they conclude that Chile did not suf-
fer a sudden stop but a current account reversal due to policy reactions and
a “sudden start” in capital outﬂows.
Kathryn M. E. Dominguez and Linda L. Tesar deal with the case of Ar-
gentina. In “International Borrowing and Macroeconomic Performance in
Argentina” Dominguez and Tesar analyze the evolution of capital ﬂows
and macroeconomic performance in Argentina from the adoption of the
Convertibility Plan in 1991 until the collapse of the pegged exchange rate
regime in early 2002. The authors place particular emphasis on the exter-
nal shocks that aﬀected the Argentine economy during this period. In the
ﬁrst part of their paper Dominguez and Tesar analyze the analytical and
policy underpinning of the 1991 Convertibility Plan, which established a
currency board type of monetary system. They also deal with the struc-
tural reforms aimed at opening the economy and privatizing state-owned
enterprises. The authors argue that in spite of these reforms the Argentine
economy was vulnerable to external shocks and, in particular, to sudden
stops of capital inﬂows. In section 7.3 of their paper Dominguez and Tesar
analyze in great detail how the major emerging countries’ crises of the
1990s aﬀected the Argentine economy. But external shocks are only part of
the story. Argentina also made some serious policy mistakes. In section 7.4
of their chapter, Dominguez and Tesar argue that the inability to control
ﬁscal ﬁnances was at the heart of Argentina’s problems. This forced the
country to borrow heavily; much of the borrowing took place overseas.
Dominguez and Tesar provide a detailed discussion of the unraveling of
Introduction 9the Argentine experience with a currency board and unrestricted capital
mobility. They point out that after exchange and capital controls were im-
posed in late 2001—through the so-called Corralito—the stock market ex-
perienced a 50 percent gain. They attribute this to the fact that the pur-
chase of Argentine stock had become the only way of transferring money
abroad via American depository receipts.
The chapter by Ilan Goldfajn and André Minella deals with Brazil’s ex-
perience with capital controls. In “Capital Flows and Controls in Brazil:
What Have We Learned?” the authors deal with the 1974–2004 period, and
discuss Brazil’s experience with several currency crises. The authors pro-
vide useful stylized facts regarding the evolution of the balance of pay-
ments and its components, focusing on current account cycles, capital ﬂow
cycles and composition, and debt accumulation. The authors argue that
during the last three decades—and in spite of the crises—there has been
signiﬁcant progress in macroeconomic management. Throughout the
1970s and 1980s Brazil had pervasive controls on capital. During the
1990s, however, a process of gradual capital account liberalization begun.
By 1993, capital inﬂows had increased signiﬁcantly, putting signiﬁcant ap-
preciating pressure on the currency. At that time the government adopted
a mechanism for restricting capital inﬂows. The private sector rapidly dis-
covered ways of circumventing the controls, and capital inﬂows continued.
In 1997–98, however, conditions changed as a result of the East Asian and
Russian currency crises, and controls on inﬂows were relaxed. In the year
2000, Brazil adopted a ﬂoating exchange rate regime and implemented in-
ﬂation targeting. This allowed the country to liberalize the current account
further. According to the authors, in spite of the signiﬁcant progress in
terms of capital account liberalization and currency convertibility attained
since the early 1990s, current regulations continue to be cumbersome and
complex.
The chapter by Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin Wei, “The Chinese Ap-
proach to Capital Inﬂows: Patterns and Possible Explanations,” deals with
China’s experience with capital ﬂows and capital account restrictions. In
order to provide a benchmark for comparison the authors adopt a cross-
country perspective to examine the evolution of capital ﬂows into China
since the early 1980s. Their analysis focuses both on the volume of capital
ﬂows and on their composition. China’s inﬂows have generally been dom-
inated by FDI. According to Prasad and Wei this is a positive pattern in
light of the recent literature on the experiences of developing countries
with ﬁnancial globalization, capital ﬂow volatility, and macroeconomic
vulnerability. The authors provide detailed data and analysis of the evolu-
tion of China’s capital controls, and discuss the possible determinants of
the pattern of capital inﬂows. The authors argue that, contrary to popular
belief, capital ﬂows into China come mainly from other advanced Asian
countries that have net trade surpluses with China, rather than from the
10 Sebastian EdwardsUnited States and Europe, which constitute China’s main export markets.
They also show that China has maintained its external debt at low levels;
non-FDI private capital inﬂows have typically been quite low, until very re-
cently. In section 9.3 of their paper Prasad and Wei discuss the recent surge
in international reserve accumulation in China. According to them a key
ﬁnding is that the drastic surge in the pace of reserve accumulation since
2001 is mostly the consequence of an increase in non-FDI capital inﬂows;
reserve accumulation has not been the result of an increased current ac-
count surplus. Prasad and Wei discuss the costs and beneﬁts of holding a
stock of reserves in the neighborhood of 40 percent of GDP. The authors
analyze why capital ﬂows into China have been concentrated so heavily on
FDI ﬂows. In order to do this they analyze in great detail the nature of
China’s capital account restrictions. They argue that “while controls on
non-FDI inﬂows as well as tax and other incentives appear to be proximate
factors for explaining the FDI-heavy composition of inﬂows, other factors
may also have contributed to this outcome.” They also argue that the evi-
dence in existence does not support the view that the composition of capi-
tal ﬂows into China is the result of a deliberate neomercantilist policy
aimed at accumulating inordinate amounts of international reserves.
In “South Korea’s Experience with International Capital Flows,” Mar-
cus Noland discusses the way in which South Korea has managed the cap-
ital account during the last twenty years. During the 1980s (and 1970s, for
that matter) Korea had a highly regulated domestic capital market and
maintained tight controls on capital mobility. Growth during this period
was nothing short of spectacular. In the early 1990s Korea initiated a pro-
cess of capital account liberalization. According to Noland this process
was implemented for pragmatic reasons. Liberalization, however, was
uneven and asymmetric and encouraged short-term bank borrowing. By
1997 the amount of short-term debt accumulated by Korean banks and
large conglomerates was very high, increasing the country’s vulnerability
to external shocks. In late 1997, in the midst of a massive speculative at-
tack, Korea succumbed to a major currency and ﬁnancial crisis. Noland
argues that until the late 1980s the control of capital mobility—and over-
all “ﬁnancial repression,” for that matter—was a key (and required) com-
ponent of an export-led development strategy that was mostly managed by
the state. According to Noland one of the fundamental objectives of capi-
tal controls was to ensure that the complex system of domestic controls,
prohibitions, and subsidies would be operative and eﬀective. This meant
that until the late 1990s capital inﬂows—including FDI and remittances—
were closely monitored and controlled. Until early 1980 Korea’s exchange
rate was pegged to the U.S. dollar. At that point a basket peg was adopted,
an eﬀort by the authorities to maintain an undervalued currency. In the
late 1980s the U.S. Treasury labeled Korea an “exchange rate manipulator,”
and urged the country to adopt a more ﬂexible regime that would reﬂect
Introduction 11market forces. In 1990 Korea implemented a band system. During the late
1980s and early 1990s the U.S. pressured Korea to open its capital markets
to international ﬂows. During the mid-1990s Korea authorized the cre-
ation of merchant banks. These had a close relationship to local conglom-
erates (chaebol) and engaged in heavy related lending. Many of these loans
were used to ﬁnance questionable projects, and by early 1997 the Korean
ﬁnancial system was overextended and highly vulnerable.
The next chapter, “Malaysian Capital Controls: Macroeconomics and
Institutions,” is by Simon Johnson, Kalpana Kochhar, Todd Mitton, and
Natalia Tamirisa. The authors’ goal is to evaluate Malaysia’s experience
with capital controls in 1998–99. They provide background information
going back to the early 1990s, and discuss the authorities’ objectives when
imposing the controls. At least on paper, the objective of the controls, as
explained by Mahathir’s administration, was to help deinternationalize the
ringgit. In September 1998 the administration required investors to re-
patriate ringgit held in oﬀshore accounts, and prohibited trading the
Malaysian currency in oﬀshore markets. According to the authors the con-
trols were imposed after Malaysia’s crisis had already reached its peak, and
it is not clear whether they were really needed. In addition, in their view it
is not clear that the controls helped Malaysia to recover. In late 1998,
shortly after Malaysia imposed the controls, all East Asian countries—
Malaysia as well as those nations that did not impose controls—began to
recover. Finally, the authors ﬁnd no evidence suggesting that the imposi-
tion of the controls had negative macroeconomic eﬀects. In the main part
of the paper the authors look at ﬁrm-level data to determine which ﬁrms
won and which ones lost as a result of the controls. They argue that in
Malaysia this type of analysis is particularly pertinent, since large ﬁrms
usually have close ties with senior politicians. Their analysis focuses on the
connection between large ﬁrms and two politicians: the prime minister
(Mohammad Mahathir) and the ﬁnance minister (Anwar Ibrahim). In
1998 there was a falling out between Mahathir and Ibrahim, and the latter
was sent to jail. After analyzing in great detail a number of micro perfor-
mance indicators, such as growth of sales, investment, indebtedness, prof-
itability, and leverage, the authors conclude that the imposition of controls
beneﬁted ﬁrms associated with Prime Minister Mahathir. The authors also
conclude that the data are inconclusive with regard to the macroeconomic
beneﬁts and costs of Malaysia’s experience with controls.
In “Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility: Singapore’s Experi-
ence,” Basant K. Kapur discusses the behavior of capital ﬂows in Singa-
pore, as well as Singapore’s experience with capital account regulations.
He argues that, in contrast with the rest of the East Asian nations, Singa-
pore’s experience with international capital ﬂows over the past two decades
has been a rather—although not completely—benign one. The reason for
this has to do with Singapore’s strong fundamentals and generally well-
12 Sebastian Edwardsconceived macroeconomic policies, including its ﬁscal policy. In order to
provide a point of comparison, Kapur begins his analysis with a discussion
of the experience of Hong Kong during the 1998 crisis. Hong Kong is an-
other city-state with a well-developed and sophisticated banking system
and equities market. It also has a currency board (CB) system similar to
that of Singapore, although with some diﬀerences. Using Hong Kong as a
point of comparison, Kapur discusses Singapore’s early experience and
policy stance. In his analysis he emphasizes Singapore’s exchange rate pol-
icy and its policy of noninternationalization of the Singapore dollar. He
also analyzes the interaction and interplay between equity and currency
markets. Kapur shows that Singapore emerged relatively unscathed from
the 1997 Asian crisis. Finally, Kapur presents an extensive discussion on
the evolution of Singapore’s debt markets. He shows that, in order to pro-
mote it, debt market restrictions on capital account convertibility—and,
more speciﬁcally, the noninternationalization policy—have been progres-
sively relaxed, while at the same time some key safeguards have been main-
tained.
In “India’s Experience with Capital Flows: The Elusive Quest for a Sus-
tainable Current Account Deﬁcit” Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik discuss In-
dia’s policies toward capital ﬂows during the last two decades. The authors
open their paper with an analysis of India’s reforms. They point out that
since the early 1990s India has implemented policies aimed at liberalizing
trade and deregulating investment decisions. Throughout most of this pe-
riod India has maintained strong controls on debt ﬂows and has encour-
aged FDI and portfolio ﬂows. At the same time the Indian authorities have
adopted a pegged nominal exchange rate regime. According to Shah and
Patnaik domestic institutional factors have resulted in relatively small FDI
ﬂows and relatively large portfolio ﬂows. They also point out that one of
India’s most severe policy dilemmas during this period has been related to
the tension between capital ﬂows and the currency regime. As in a large
number of emerging countries—both in Asia and elsewhere—large capital
inﬂows have put signiﬁcant appreciation pressure on the real exchange
rate. This has aﬀected the country’s degree of international competitive-
ness, and has eroded the support to the liberalization policies. According
to Shah and Patnaik, many tactical details of the intricate reforms to the
capital controls derive from the interlocking relationships between mone-
tary policy, the currency regime, and capital ﬂows. The authors point out
that recently the accumulation of international reserves has played an im-
portant role. An additional manifestation of the tension between exchange
rate policy and capital ﬂows has been the signiﬁcant increase in the volatil-
ity of nominal rupee-dollar returns. The authors argue that in spite of the
progress achieved since the reforms were adopted, the goal of the early
1990s—of ﬁnding a consistent way to augment investment using current
account deﬁcits—has remained elusive.
Introduction 13The volume closes with a broad and comprehensive evaluation of the
functioning of capital controls and their eﬀects on macroeconomic perfor-
mance. In “Capital Controls: An Evaluation,” Nicolas Magud and Car-
men M. Reinhart analyze the literature on capital controls and economic
performance. They argue that this literature is confusing and has been
characterized by at least ﬁve major shortcomings. First, there is no uniﬁed
theoretical framework to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of
capital controls; this is the case both for controls on outﬂows and for con-
trols on inﬂows. Second, most of the literature has not taken into account
the fact that there is a signiﬁcant heterogeneity across countries and time
in the control measures implemented. Not all countries are similar; more-
over, diﬀerent episodes in the same country tend to have signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences. Third, there are many (and very diﬀerent) deﬁnitions of what con-
stitutes a successful experience with capital controls. Many times authors
don’t specify what speciﬁc criterion they are using for deﬁning success.
Fourth, the existing empirical studies lack a common methodology. Fi-
nally, the empirical evidence on the eﬀects and eﬀectiveness of capital con-
trols has been dominated by the experiences of only two countries: Chile
and Malaysia. In this paper, Magud and Reinhart address some of these
shortcomings in several ways. First, the authors are very explicit about
what measures are construed as capital controls. Also, given that “success”
is measured so diﬀerently across studies, Magud and Reinhart try to stan-
dardize the results of more than thirty empirical studies on capital controls
and economic performance. This standardization process was done by
constructing two indexes of capital controls. The ﬁrst one is called the Cap-
ital Controls Eﬀectiveness index (CCE index), and the second one is re-
ferred to as the Weighted Capital Control Eﬀectiveness index (WCCE in-
dex). The diﬀerence between the two is that the WCCE controls for the
diﬀerentiated degree of methodological rigor used in each of the papers.
Also, the authors present evidence on episodes with capital controls that
are not as well known as those of Chile and Malaysia.
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